Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal has proposed limiting of the role of UNMIN in Nepal. To be more precise, he has proposed that UNMIN’s role be downgraded from Political mission overseeing the peace process to technical mission that would only monitor Maoist combatants in the cantonments. He is quoted saying that in the wake of “changed circumstances” the concept of two party has ceased to exist after the UCPN-Maoists have entered parliamentary politics. It is also not surprising that this proposal has quickly gained wide acceptance among different political camps including Nepali Congress. What I would attempt to do in three sections of this article is to dig into a Srilankan-Tamil conflict in order to make indications as to what this proposal could potentially mean to Nepal and the future of its peace process. I do not wish to delegitimize Srilankan people’s aspiration for peace and stability in their country which is emerging from two decades of conflict, nor am I making comparative judgments on the parties in conflict. My attempt here is to question Nepalese government if we are prepared to risk the peace process and million lives to do it the harder way as Srilanka did? And as far as my understanding tells me, when Prime Minister Madhav Nepal talks about limiting the role of UNMIN in Nepal and Congress leader Ram Sharan Mahat advocates to bringing Nepal Army out of UNMIN surveillance, there is more than a mere “downsizing” going on and not only the political stakeholders but every sections of citizenry need to be aware of the paramount-ness of this proposal.
I
In the year 2002, when the Srilankan government and LTTE were in political negotiation with Norwegian government lending its good office, there was a growing optimism that it would bring a peaceful end to one of the bloodiest conflict in the region which saw tens of thousands of deaths on both sides. The horrors of high ranking assassinations of Srilankan politicians and the brutal assassination of ex-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were indication to the entire world of the extent that the Tigers were willing to go in their course of action. The mounting death tolls and international pressure forced the Srilankan government and the LTTE to initiate a peace dialogue, although the hardliners within the Island nation were not happy with the government’s “softened” approach to dealing with the situation. From December 2001 when the ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the LTTE to July 2006 when the major military offense against LTTE in the eastern province began, two important events took place which would ultimately lead to tragic events post January 2008. In March 2004, Colonel Karuna, one of the chief commander of the LTTE in the eastern Srilanka broke away with his soldiers from LTTE which substantially decreased Tiger’s military strength. He would go on to join the ruling Srilankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and become an influential parliamentarian, which has now cleared initial doubts about his defection being engineered. The other event that turned the political tide against the LTTE is their decision to boycott the 2006 presidential election. Political analysts are of the view that most of the vote for Ranil Wicramasinghe who wanted to negotiate peace with the LTTE was lost due to election boycott called by the LTTE. This paved way for election of Mahinda Rajapaksha who has been known for his hardline rhetoric against the LTTE. Mr. Rajapaksha quickly read the geopolitical situation of the post 9/11 South Asia. With American “War on Terror” in the neighborhood, the US State Department’s warning to LTTE came as a green signal for Rajpaksha. And amidst all the talk efforts going on and ceasefire still “officialy” existing in papers, the Srilankan military began major offence against LTTE in July 2006 from their most vulnerable point, the eastern province. The Vankalai Massacre where both mother and a nine year old daughter were raped next to each other before being murdered on cold blood along with their family members by the Srilankan Army and execution of 17 French Charity workers from Action Against Hunger (ACF) in their office in Mooduthara of Muthur district caused international condemnation as Srilanka Military Monitaring Mission (SLMM) claimed in its statement that the government forces were behind the execution. As the military moved towards the north, Srilankan Air Force carried out an air strike in the Mullaitivu area, killing unarmed civilians.SLMM stated they counted 19 bodies of young Tamil girls whom the LTTE claimed were orphans attending first aid training. The government stated that it was an LTTE training facility and that the children were LTTE child soldiers. In either case, what is clear is that innocent children were bombed to death in that attack. What could be the justification- a collateral damage? After these events, the Srilankan government became very critical, almost intolerant of SLMM presence in the area. To further the problems, the SLMM was substantially reduced in its manpower when Swedish, Danish and the Finnish members pulled out of the SLMM after LTTE questioned their neutrality on the basis that their government had banned LTTE and hence its citizens could not be expected to become an impartial observers. The SLMM press release dated 12 December 2006 expressed its displeasure over Srilankan Forces’ restricting SLMM monitors from visiting the areas where ground operations were taking place.The ruling party ministers and politicians kept attacking SLMM and Norwegian diplomats of being “pro LTTE”. Lakshman Kadirgamar, the ex-foreign minister demanded that they leave if they they would not help bring democracy to LTTE controlled areas. Anura Bandaranaike, a minister of the ruling party questioned Norway's credibility as an impartial negotiator. In this way, the peace monitor and the negotiator were first discredited, restricted and gradually sidelined as SLMM terminated its mission in Srilanka in January 2008 when the military operations intensified from east to the north. In war, there are no heroes and everybody has blood in their hands. But in order to decode the complexities of the political conflict, one has to go into the politics of narratives. The images and stories coming out of the war zone have a politics behind them, the politics which silences the images and stories that run counter to them, and with SLMM terminating its mission, we would never know about those images and stories.
II
In this section I will focus on the challenges and criticisms UNMIN has faced in its mandate and role in Nepal’s peace process and why inspite of several pitfalls, it still has a crucial role to play in the peace process. But before I get into that I would like to quote from UNMIN’s official website where it is clearly stated that coming into existence as per UNSC resolution 1740, it was established in response to the letter to the Secretary-General sent on 9 August 2006 by the then Seven-Party Alliance Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) requesting United Nations' assistance in creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of the Constituent Assembly and the entire peace process. The resolution specifies the mandate as following:
• monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
• assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel
• assist in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements
• provide technical assistance to the Election Commission in the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere
It is clear that, with CA elections taking place in April 2008, UNMIN still has three mandate of which all three are continuous and crucial part as far as peace process is concerned. So when PM Madhav Nepal proposes “limiting UNMIN’s role”, it consequently means UNMIN operating short of its stated mandate. Even a layperson’s analysis could rationalize the fact that limiting any of the three mandate could have significant impact on the overall peace process.
In the last few weeks there is an idea floated by COAS Chattra Man Gurung, which has been supported by PM Nepal and Defense Minister Bhandari that Nepal Army should be kept outside UNMIN’s monitoring if its mission be extended at all. As the date for UNMIN to terminate its mission comes closer PM Nepal has been in serious marketing campaign for this idea. But in case this proposal is pushed forward, the government will face serious legal and moral questions within nation and internationally as to why one army is being kept in surveillance while the other is exempted. The decision could also lead to the PLA refusing to continue being monitored, causing a breakdown of the peace process, the moral burden of which would ultimately come on the current government. Is the government willing to risk the peace process just because the army is having some administrative problems like recruiting in vacant positions? If it is then one is justified in questioning the intention of the government especially when the AMMAA (Agreement on Monitoring and Management of Arms and Armies) has clearly stated that any recruitment in either of the two armies amounts to breach of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). What is even more baffling is that the government is not even willing to consider a clause “unless agreed by parties” in the AMMAA article 5.1.9 which leaves possibility for negotiated recruitment on case-to-case basis and could serve purpose for the interim period.
The other logic being floated for terminating UNMIN’s mandate is that “the concept of two parties in conflict” is no more valid after Maoists have formally entered parliamentary system. But does this logic hold any merit? The “two parties in conflict” are the Nepal Army and the PLA neither of whom are in the parliament. On 27th May 2008, only the political wing of the UCPN-M entered the Parliament, its armed wing PLA is very much a rebel Army which still has its physical presence in the cantonments in different parts of the country and is currently in a state of cease fire with the Nepal Army. So to argue that there are “no two parties” is misleading and incorrect by political and legal interpretation.
The other thing that we have to keep at the back of our mind is the fact that there has been several instances where political actors have used public platform to openly question UNMIN’s neutrality and these accusations would certainly haunt the political discourse in the country as 15th September approaches and there would be many casual indications made in this regard. On December 1 2008, in a televised interview when Ian Martin, who then headed the UN mission in Nepal, was asked about Nepali Congress’s criticism “that UNMIN focused too much on army integration and not on property return”; he had replied that the reason for UNMIN’s focus on the issue is in consistent with its specified mandate and that issue of property return is a political issue to be settled between the political parties. However, he did express UNMIN’s principled position in favor of compensating the victims and return of their properties but said that UNMIN does not have mandate for actual role in the issue. Another criticism directed at UNMIN in the same program was a quoted remark from a retired Indian General Ashok Mehta who had said that UNMIN was a “referee without a whistle”. But Martin made it very clear to his host and his audience that although UNMIN may not have an authority to card the player, it does have a whistle that it would blow whenever a player fouls the game. And there is enough evidence to prove that UNMIN has blown its whistle time and again reporting violations on either side. I state some of them here;
• On Feb 7, 2008 UNMIN criticizes CPN-Maoists for declaring people’s councils and asks them for clarification on the issue.
• On 18 April 2008, in its report to Secretary General, UNMIN expressed concern over recruitment of child soldiers in the PLA. This issue was raised continuously by UNMIN until Maoists finally released all the identified child soldiers on 8th February 2010.
• In its 15 January 2010 briefing to Security Council, UNMIN referred to fresh recruitment in Nepal Army as being “problematic to peace process”. The report also condemns UCPN-Maoists’ land grab in Southern Terai belts and seizure of crops in the mid and far western districts.
• In its report to Secretary General on April 2010, UNMIN expressed its concern over Nepal Army’s recruitment drive which had received clearance from Ministry of Defense. The report also criticized the views expressed by some of the UCPN-Maoist leaders as raising suspicion about their commitment to peace.
• On 3rd August 2010 UNMIN expressed its concern over possible recruitment drive in both the armies reminding both the parties that it would amount to breach of CPA. It had earlier rejected the proposal to fill natural vacancies under AMMAA article 5.1.9.
The above facts not only explains the role UNMIN has played in Nepal’s peace process but infers as to why its presence is so crucial in the coming days and as long as the last of the combatants in the cantonment has either been rehabilitated or integrated in the national army.
III
As the country enters an important phase marked by uncertainty over the timely completion of the constitution writing amidst outstanding issues and six unsuccessful attempts to forming a consensus government; the political atmosphere in Nepal is getting muddy. The line of fair and unfair play are getting blurred as major parties are taking short-cuts to country’s political steering after being unable to agree on a common road map to peace. In such a situation, role of UNMIN as a whistle blower becomes all the more crucial and attempts to discredit or limit its role short of its mandate has to be viewed with skepticism because these are dangerous times where blunders can result into political disasters and nothing short of peace and country’s future is at stake. A Srilankan friend of mine once said to me how much he envies the way Nepal handled its peace process. On any other day I would have found the statement ironic given the mess our political elites have created in the country. But having seen the abjection of broken peace with my own eyes, I am still glad to live in this prolonged transition with hope for peace still in sight, rather than go back to the horrors of Madi, Dorambha and Ghorahi. In a volatile atmosphere, it is quite natural to be cynical but to be blinded by this cynicism, refusing to reason through is even more blasphemous and there are plenty of those who enjoy fishing in troubled waters. This is something that worst of the critics on either end of the political spectrum as well as the “holiest” of the liberal intellectuals of Nepalese society need to appreciate about the region we live in. Why make ruckus over who is talking in the taped conversation, whether authentic or not? I would instead worry more about the kind of political culture on which we are trying to lay foundation of this new republic. If 10 million was the negotiated individual demand, why should we believe that there was no contending price in offer? I was taught in my eighth standard Physics class that when there is a vacuum, pressure is exerted from all direction- north or south. Why blame the market? As long as somebody makes demand, somebody always supplies- that’s market. What the political elites of Nepal need to decide now is whether they are marketing politics? If they are not then the leaders have to first stop trying to sell their road maps and resist importing them as well. They should stop trying to score against one another because there are no adversaries here. We are all supposed to be on the same side with the same goals to score - Peace, Stability and Constitution. If the turf remains, the games may be played again. And until we learn to live and play by the rules, we need a whistle blower. So every section of Nepalese as well as international community who genuinely want to see the country safely out of transition, should unequivocally urge the government to extend UNMIN’s mission until the completion of the peace process in Nepal.
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